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This paper examines the negative impact the Brazilian Bolsa Família 
Program (BFP) may have on autonomous political participation and tries to 
present a discussion about how to minimize this impact, without damaging the 
rights conditional cash transfer programs, as the BFP, seek to promote. The paper 
is organized in three main parts. The first part is devoted to presenting an 
overview of the basic structure of BFP, the most relevant evidence on the results 
of the program in general and, in particular, its negative impact on the political 
autonomy of its beneficiaries, due to its potential to induce some form of 
clientelism.  In the second part, the study offers a discussion about the relationship 
between, on the one hand, political rights and democracy and, on other, the 
fundamental rights to subsistence and food security, especially given Latin 
America’s reality.  Finally, in the third part, the study seeks to suggest, for 




The current structure of the BFP dates from 2004, and consolidates other 
conditional cash transfer programs created in the late 1990s1. Broadly speaking, 
																																																								
1 Law No. 10.836, of January 9, 2004: Art. 1o It is created, within the Presidency of the 
Republic, the Bolsa Família Program, aimed at the actions of income transfer according to 
some conditionalities. Sole Paragraph. The Program to which refers the caput is intended to 
unify the management and implementation procedures of actions to transfer income of the 
Federal Government, especially those of the Programa Nacional de Renda Mínima [National 
Program of Minimum Wage] linked to Education – Bolsa Escola, established by the Law No. 
10.219, of April 11, 2001, of the Programa Nacional de Acesso à Alimentação [National 
Program of Acess to Food] – PNAA, established by the Law No. 10.689, of June 13, 2003, of 
the Programa Nacional de Renda Mínima [National Program of Minimum Wage] linked to 
Health – Bolsa Alimentação, established by the Provisional Executive Order No. 2.206-1, of 





the BFP pays three types of benefits: (i) the basic benefit, in the amount of R$ 
70.002 per month for families with monthly income per capita below R$ 70.00, (ii) 
a variable benefit, for families with income per capita below R$ 140.003, in the 
amount of R$ 32.004 (capped at R$ 160.005 per family), linked to the existence, in 
the family, of pregnant women, lactating mothers, children and teenagers between 
0 and 15 years old; and (iii) another variable benefit, for families with monthly 
income per capita below R$ 140.00, in the amount of R$ 38.006 (maximum of R$ 
76.00 per family 7 ), linked to the existence, in the family, of teenagers aged 
between 16 and 17 years old. The benefits can be added up in cases of families 
with monthly income per capita below R$ 70.00. 
 
In addition to the criteria regarding the maximum income per capita and, in 
the case of variable benefits, the presence of family members under certain 
circumstances, the ability to receive such benefits will depend on the fulfillment of 
certain conditions 8 . In the variable benefit linked to children and teenagers, 
																																																																																																																																																														
4.102, of January 24, 2002, and of the Cadastramento Único [Single Registration] of the 
Federal Government, established by the Decree No. 3.877, July 24, 2001.  
2 Approximately US$ 39. 
3 Approximately US$ 78. 
4 Approximately US$ 18. 
5 Approximately US$ 89. 
6 Approximately US$ 21. 
7 Approximately US$ 42. 
8 In Brazil, there is a conflict between two very different views on the subject of income 
transfer. One group – which turned out to be politically victorious – advocates a program of 
cash transfers linked to the families’ social and economic conditions and to conditionalities, in 
the model of the Bolsa Família. Another group, however, supports a program of universal 
basic income, according to which a value would be paid to all citizens and foreigner residents 
regardless of social and economic conditions or the compliance with any condition.  
The basic income model came to be made into law: it is the Law No. 10.835, of January 8, 
2004 (one day before the publication of the Bolsa Família Act). The following is what the Art. 
1 of the Act reads: It is established, from 2005 on, the citizenship basic income, which will be 
the right of all Brazilians living in the country and foreigners residing for at least 5 (five) years 
in Brazil, regardless of their socioeconomic conditions, to receive an annual monetary benefit. 
§1o The range mentioned in the caput of this article should be achieved gradually, at the 
discretion of the Executive, focusing on the poorer segments of the population. §2o Payment 
of benefits must be of equal value for everyone, and enough to meet the minimum 
expenditure of each person with food, education and health, considering, in order to do this, 
the country’s development degree and the budget possibilities. This law was never regulated 





Brazilian law requires school frequency of at least 85% for children and teenagers 
up to 15 years old, and 75% for teenagers between 16 and 17 years old. The law 
also determines the need for nutritional and health routine check-ups, but the 
existing standards are not so specific on the subject, with only a general indication 
of the need for child immunization and prenatal care for pregnant women. Another 
condition involves child labor: if child labor is found in a family, the benefits may 
be suspended. Although the specific legislation provides the general rules of the 
BFP, all the values involved (minimum income per capita, which is the eligible 
criteria for the program, or the benefits’ value) can be changed directly by the 
Federal Administration. Also, the specific discipline of the program’s 
requirements and the supervision of their fulfillment may be found in acts of the 
Federal Administration9. 
 
The benefit payment is made directly to the beneficiary account maintained 
in a bank controlled by the Federal Administration and administrated with a 
magnetic card. This is an interesting aspect of the program because most of the 
beneficiaries, who did not have access to the banking system before, obtained such 
access only due to the specific BFP requirements regulating the benefits payment. 
That also created the opportunity to open bank accounts regardless of other 
requirements normally demanded in the banking market. The regulation also 
provides that the holder of the BFP benefit should preferably be a woman, who, 
whenever possible, should be indicated as head of the household. There is no 
deadline for participation in the program and there is no conditionality associated 
with seeking employment or improving professional qualification. According to 
data from the Federal Government, over 13 million families receive benefits from 
the BFP 10 . According to the latest census (2010), the sum of the Brazilian 
population is 190,732,694 people11. Thus, assuming each family comprises four 
																																																								
9  The current values were defined by the Decrees No. 6.917/2009 and No. 7.447/2011, 







people, on average, it is reasonable to conclude that 52 million people in the 
country are benefited by BFP. That means over 25% of the population. 
 
The Brazilian BFP is not an isolated phenomenon. Only in Latin America, 
several other countries have some sort of conditional cash transfer program 
(Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua, Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Jamaica, Argentina, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Jamaica, Argentina, El Salvador, 
Uruguay, Paraguay, Dominican Republic, Peru and Panama). Some studies 
identify the following common features in these programs: they all involve the 
payment of cash benefits to very poor families (in general with school-age 
children); it is common that the benefit is paid, preferably, to women; and the 
benefit has, as a counterpart, the need of compliance, by the family, of certain 
obligations in terms of education (minimum enrollment and attendance to school) 
and health (often some kind of routine check-ups). Beyond these general features, 
some countries have adopted, for example, a maximum period of permanence in 
the program (Mexico and Chile) and other conditions like the attendance to job 
training programs (Argentina)12.  
 
Back to Brazil, and under the rules of the program published by the Federal 
Administration, the BFP has five main objectives: (i) promote access to the 
network of free-of-charge public services, especially those related to health, 
education and social assistance; (ii) fight hunger and promote food and nutritional 
security; (iii) stimulate sustained emancipation of families living in poverty and 
extreme poverty; (iv) combat poverty; and (v) promote intersectorality, 
complementarity and synergy within governmental social initiatives 13 . The 
evidence already produced shows that the program has been able to accomplish 
some of these goals but has not been successful in relation to others14.  
																																																								
12 Draibe, Sonia. Programas de Transferências Condicionadas de Renda in América Latina – 
Desafios da Democracia e do Desenvolvimento. In Políticas Sociais para além da crise, 
Fernando Henrique, Cardoso e Alejandro Foxley (editores), 2009, p. 103-143. 
13 Decree No. 5.209, 17 September, 2004, art. 4º. 






Surveys indicate that the BFP has had considerable success in minimizing 
hunger, securing minimum standards of food safety and removing a major portion 
of the Brazilian population from levels of extreme poverty. Studies show, for 
instance, that participation in the program increases between 7 to 11 percentage 
points the probability of homes to be in a situation of food security. With respect 
to health, especially for children, the BFP allows people to spend more on food, 
though there is no record of increasing spending, for example, in child hygiene 
and the program did not affect childhood vaccinations in a relevant way 15 . 
Regarding education, the data shows that there was a slight increase in enrollment, 
though enrollment levels were already high. The program helped to reduce school 
evasion, increased school attendance and helped to reduce the amount of child’s 
labor hours (though not in a very relevant way). However, there is no evidence 
that the BFP has had any positive impact on children and teenagers school 
performance, which is still quite low in Brazil. There is also no indication that the 
program has fostered families involvement in their children’s education (generally 
considered an important factor to improve learning and school performance)16.  
 
On the other hand, research shows that the program has not been able to 
stimulate the sustained emancipation of the families it has benefited, one of its 
																																																																																																																																																														
avanços e desafios. IPEA, 2010.  
15 Camelo, Rafael de Souza; Tavares, Priscilla Albuquerque; e Saiani, Carlos César Santejo, 
Alimentação, Nutrição e Saúde em Programas de Transferência de Renda: Evidências para o 
Programa Bolsa Família, Revista EconomiA, Selecta, v.10, n.4, p.685–713, dezembro 2009. 
16 Cardoso, Eliana; e Souza, André Portela. The impact of cash transfers on child labor and 
school attendance in Brazil, Working Paper No. 04-W07, Departament of Economics 
Vanderbilt University, April 2004 (www.vanderbilt.edu/econ); Glewwe, Paul; e Kassouf, Ana 
Lucia, The Impact of the Bolsa Escola/Familia Conditional Cash Transfer  Program on 
Enrollment, Grade Promotion and Drop out Rates in Brazil 
(http://www.anpec.org.br/encontro2008/artigos/200807211140170-.pdf) Mega, Luciano 
Farias. Mudanças causadas pelo programa de transferência direta de renda, Bolsa Família, 
aos beneficiários de Santa Vitória do Palmar, RS, Dissertação apresentada ao Curso de 
Serviço Social da Universidade Católica de Pelotas como requisito para obtenção do grau de 
Mestre em Política Social, 2008, 
(http://www.ucpel.tche.br/mps/dissertacoes/Mestrado/2008/Dissertacao_Luciano_Mega.pdf); 
Estrella, Juliana; e Ribeiro, Leando Molhano. Qualidade da gestão das condicionalidades do 
Programa Bolsa Família: uma discussão sobre o índice de gestão Descentralizada, Revista 





goals. The program regulation stipulates that it will be temporary in nature, will 
not generate vested rights and the family’s registration will be reviewed every two 
years17. There is no record, however, of any relevant disqualification of families 
by a spontaneous increase in income. Instead, the number of families in the 
program has grown significantly over time. Apparently, the benefits paid by the 
program help the families with their basic needs – particularly food needs – but do 
not create conditions for an income growth that allows them to stop depending on 
the program to fulfill these same needs18.  
 
The data provided above intend to evaluate the results of BFP in achieving 
its own goals. And, in summary, we can conclude that the BFP has been relatively 
successful in its basic goals of eradicating hunger and extreme poverty, promoting 
food security and contributing to reduce school evasion. Nonetheless, and despite 
the time already passed since the program started, it has not been able to foster the 
sustained emancipation of the families who receive its benefits.  
 
What we would like to do now is to examine some existing evidence about 
the impact of BFP on other issues considered relevant in contemporary societies, 
not directly related to the program objectives. There are already studies, for 
example, discussing the impact of the BFP on the gender politics (given the focus 
on women as the head of the household)19. The aim of this study is to address a 
																																																								
17 Decree No. 5.209/2004, art. 21. 
18 Draibe, Sonia, Programas de Transferências Condicionadas de Renda in América Latina – 
Desafios da Democracia e do Desenvolvimento. In Políticas Sociais para além da crise, 
Fernando Henrique, Cardoso e Alejandro Foxley (editores), 2009, p. 103-143; Kerstenetzky, 
Celia Lessa. Redistribuição e Desenvolvimento? A Economia Política do Programa Bolsa 
Família, DADOS – Revista de Ciências Sociais, Vol . 52, n1, 2009, pp. 53 a 83; Sousa, 
Juliane Martins Carneiro de. A superação da pobreza através da distribuição justa das 
riquezas sociais: uma análise da consistência teórica do Programa Bolsa Família e das 
perspectivas dos beneficiários de saída autosustentada do Programa (Dissertação de 
Mestrado apresentada à Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e de Empresas – FGV), 
2009; e Rego Walquiria Leão, Aspectos teóricos das políticas de cidadania: uma 
aproximação ao Bolsa Família, Revista Lua Nova, 73: 147-185, 2008. 
19 As mentioned above, the option of preferably giving responsability for the Family unit to 
women is common in conditional cash transfer programs in Latin America. On this subject v. 
Gomes, Simone da Silva Ribeiro. Notas preliminares de uma crítica feminista aos programas 
de transferência direta de renda – o caso do Bolsa Família no Brasil, Revista Textos & 





specific side effect of BFP: the impact of the program on the political autonomy of 
its participants. For the purposes of this study, political autonomy means freedom 
of choice in the context of voting20.  
 
A number of studies indicate that the BFP has played an especially 
important role in the last Brazilian elections, helping the continuation in the 
Executive branches (especially in the Presidency) of the political party that created 
the program, and stimulating the development of a contemporary form of 
clientelism. These studies claim that the BFP induces families that receive its 
benefits to vote for State governors linked to the program (or for those politically 
sponsored by them), minimizing their political autonomy, once the benefit paid is 
seen as a gift from the political authority. This perception establishes a kind of 
personal connection between the group of beneficiaries and the authority. In this 
context, and in exchange for the benefits/gifts received (and hoping to preserve 
them), the payback from the individuals would be electoral support. This 
relationship of subordination and dependence that exists between those who 
manage the program and those who receive benefits is close to the old models of 
patronage and minimizes the individuals real freedom to, at the moment of the 
vote, express their political preference in an autonomous way21. 
 
																																																								
20 Political autonomy may involve, of course, many other activities, besides the act of voting.  
21 Bursztyn, Marcel; e Salgueiro, Suely, Ligações perigosas: proteção social e clientelismo no 
Semiárido Nordestino, Revista Estudos Sociais e Agrícolas, vol. 19, n. 1, 2011: 30-61; 
González, Zaira. Rewarding Voters Through Welfare Transfers in Mexico and Brazil, March 
12, 2011 (http://people.carleton.edu/~amontero/Zaira%20Gonzalez.pdf); Zucco, Cesar. 
Conditional Cash Transfers and Voting Behavior: Redistribution and Clientelism in Developing 
Democracies, February 1, 2011 (Electronic copy available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1753234); Licio, Elaine Cristina; Rennó, Lucio R.; Castro, Henrique 
Carlos de O. de. Bolsa Família e Voto na Eleição Presidencial de 2006: em busca do elo 
perdido, Revista Opinião Pública, vol. 15, nº 1, Junho, 2009, p.31-54; Marques, Rosa Maria; 
Leite, Marcel Guedes; Mendes, Áquila; Ferreira, Mariana Ribeiro Jansen. Discutindo o papel 
do Programa Bolsa família na decisão das eleições presidenciais brasileiras de 2006, Revista 
de Economia Política, vol. 29, nº 1 (113), pp. 114-132, janeiro-março/2009; e Cânedo-
Pinheiro, Maurício. Bolsa Família ou desempenho da economia? Determinantes da reeleição 







This relationship of dependence, as well as the damage to the political 
autonomy, seems to be worsened precisely because, as noted above, the BFP deals 
with very basic needs of an extremely poor population, but does not lead to a 
sustained emancipation of these individuals. The benefits paid by the BFP help 
minimize hunger and poverty, but if they cease to be paid, families will return to 
their previous state of poverty and food insecurity because they are not capable of 
supplying these needs independently. So, from the perspective of their subsistence, 
it is really important that the program continues and, therefore, the political group 
committed to the program must be voted for. It is interesting that the relationship 
of dependence established is not purely individual, considering the beneficiaries, 
once the criteria for program participation are relatively objective. In fact, the 
relationship of dependence is established between the authority and the group of 
people awarded the benefit or even eligible for the program. Some studies suggest 
that a similar phenomenon of clientelism occur in other Latin American countries, 
which also have conditional cash transfer programs in place. In the Brazilian case, 
the problem seems especially worrisome given the fact that more than 25% of the 
population benefits from the program, which is already running for about 10 years 
(actually, more than 10 years, considering that other conditional cash transfer 
programs existed before the BFP). 
 
The question raised by the data described above is complex and especially 
relevant for Latin America in general and Brazil in particular for another reason. 
Extreme poverty and hunger were (and still are) real and far-reaching problems in 
Brazil and in other Latin American countries. On the other hand, almost all 
countries of the continent have a history of authoritarian movements, many of 
them with significant populist appeal. Research conducted by the United Nations 
Development Program (2002-2004) reveal a high index of Latin American 
ambivalence toward democracy. In a poll in the region, most of the interviewed 
answered that economic development is more important than democracy and that 





Over 40% of those who participated in the survey do not believe that democracy is 
capable of solving the problems of the country22.  
 
To what point do these data lead us? Are clientelism, and the consequent 
restriction of poor people political autonomy, the inevitable price to be paid to 
solve the problem of hunger? But for how long, if conditional cash transfer 
programs are not capable to induce autonomy in generating income? Is the present 
generation of adults really lost, and the only possible thing to do is to invest in 
their children? Is political autonomy actually less important and should be 
sacrificed for the achievement of a greater good? But sacrificed for how long and 





History reveals that, in times of severe economic crisis – such as wars or 
natural disasters, for example – people consent to increase the power to the 
government, and, as a consequence, to suffer greater restrictions on their freedom 
and autonomy, so that the political authority can address the causes of the crisis 
and overcome them. Although we cannot say Brazil faces any crisis of this nature, 
what could be said about the number of people in a state of permanent poverty and 
hunger in the country? It seems natural that the means available to satisfy their 
basic needs for food and shelter are more important to them – at least more urgent 
– than political autonomy or ideal conditions for democracy. As a matter of fact, 
however, the misery in which these people live does not necessarily have a 
specific cause (such as war, for instance). It is, in general, a phenomenon much 
more complex and with multiple causes, that cannot be solved by exceptional or 
emergency measures that political authorities could provide, even if they had the 
power to do so. In other words, to grant extraordinary powers to the Government 
																																																								






will not necessarily solve the problem on a permanent basis. How, then, to relate 
the apparent tension between economic development and social rights versus 
democracy and political autonomy in a context of institutional normality (outside 
of emergencies)? 
 
Reducing hunger is directly connected to the preservation of life, to human 
dignity and, for these reasons, is a huge priority in the context of fundamental 
rights. The question of time emphasizes that priority. Unlike what can eventually 
happen with other rights, hungry people cannot afford to wait for a long time for 
that right to be granted. In Brazil, the Federal Constitution provides that access to 
food is a social right (art. 6), which means that the Government should provide 
some kind of support to prevent people from reaching levels of extreme poverty 
and starvation. In fact, besides the BFP, Brazilian Social Security Office provides 
a number of other benefits for people who, for various reasons, are unable to 
provide their own subsistence. Food access is also considered a human right from 
the perspective of international standards. The article 25-I of the UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) provides that "Everyone has the right to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family, including food (...)". In addition to a right in itself, the right to food and 
other rights related to minimum subsistence work as conditions to the effective 
exercise of basic liberties. Indeed, the formal recognition of freedom of 
expression, assembly, association, profession or initiative means little to those 
who are illiterate, hungry and have no place to live.  
 
On the other hand, however, and though on another level, political 
autonomy is also a fundamental right recognized by democratic States 23  and 
international society24. If it is true that access to food is directly linked to human 
																																																								
23  The Brazilian Constitution deals extensively with political rights, political pluralism and 
democratic institutions. 
24 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN (1948): “Article 21. 1. Everyone has the 
right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives. 2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. 3. 





dignity, from the perspective of the physical existence of the individual, it is also 
true that the right to political participation and the right of self-government – or, in 
a more modest way, the power to influence decisions that will affect the political 
instances in society (or at least the power to influence the choice of those who will 
take such decisions) – are also rights that connect with human dignity, from the 
perspective of equality. If all men and women are equal, nobody has the right, in 
himself or herself, to govern others. The decisions that affect the community 
should be taken by everybody (the winning majority) or, at least, those who will 
be responsible for the decision making process should be selected by the vote of 
the majority of people. 
 
Interestingly, in addition to a right in itself, political autonomy also has an 
instrumental character in relation to other rights. Through political participation, 
Government can be led to implement policies more or less comprehensive for the 
protection and promotion of certain rights. The priorities Government pursues and 
the actions it implements are guided, to some extent, and influenced by election 
results. Thus, it seems consistent to say that, to some extent, political participation 
can drive the Government to create social, educational and economic conditions so 
that individuals are able to make a living and to no longer depend on Government 
to meet their basic needs (or, at least, that only a small part of the population 
would depend on government aid to eat – not 25% of the population). That is, 
besides being a right in itself, autonomous political participation can guide state 
action towards the promotion of certain rights, including rights related to the 
existential minimum. 
 
In this context, and considering the connections established between 
different rights over time, it seems wrong to establish a hierarchy between 
fundamental rights and, particularly, to fix a hierarchical relationship between the 
																																																																																																																																																														
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage 






right to access to food (or any other social right) and the right to political 
participation. This consciousness is important because, although it may be a truism 
to say that political autonomy is also a fundamental right, the fantasy that we 
could have a good, competent and efficient dictator – who could save us from our 
hardships and secure rights, all without the need for tedious and slow democratic 
political action – seems to be very vivid in the Latin American political imaginary. 
 
 In more concrete terms, it is certain that the right to political participation 
has many dimensions and presents a lot of complexities, since it relates back to the 
discussion around the very concept of democracy. There is no need to tackle this 
debate at this time. That is because, despite the controversies regarding the 
concept of democracy, people will generally agree that the right to political 
participation involves, at least, the existence of free and periodic elections, 
universal right to vote and to run for office and the possibility of some kind of 
control – at least through the election process – over the performance of public 
officials. People will also agree, at least in general, that, beyond the formal 
provisions on the right to vote and to run for office, autonomous political 
participation requires these rights to be freely exercised. But what does it mean to 
“freely exercise” the right to vote? Which conditions are required so that one can 
say a person can freely exercise his or her right to vote? Or, on the other hand, 
which conditions may affect the free exercise of the voting rights?   
 
The identification of the conditions required for the free exercise of the 
right to vote will inevitably involve the historical and cultural circumstances of 
each country. In most democratic countries, for example, the law determines the 
secrecy of vote. Freedom of speech, particularly with respect to political criticism, 
and political pluralism are well considered conditions to autonomous political 
participation. Most people will also agree that public policies that establish 
clientelistic relationships between the government and some groups of citizens 
may affect the free exercise of their voting rights, since it can make it difficult for 






There is no precise conceptualization of the phenomenon of political 
clientelism, as it can take several forms. Either way, the use of the term clientelism 
in contemporary political environment seeks to describe situations in which people 
provide political support to the authority, or to a particular political group, as a 
payback for some sort of personal profit received from this authority. The 
relationship established between individuals and the Government in this context is 
not one of citizenship, but one of subordination. The person views the personal 
profit as a sort of favor (and not a right), which is provided by the person 
exercising the authority, with whom he or she establishes a bond of loyalty. The 
other side of this relationship is the political and electoral support provided by the 
individual. Voting, therefore, is no longer an opportunity in which the individual 
can control the action of public officials, but the moment to “return the favor” for 






Of course one can say that any vote, in a democracy, can be described by 
almost the same logic. People vote according to their best interest, in terms of the 
benefits they have received or the benefits they expect to receive from the 
Government, directly or indirectly. It is not the case to make any moral judgment 
about the various kinds of interests – personal or collective, ideological or not, etc. 
– that can determine the vote of each individual. However, the sensitive point, 
which seems to distinguish the self-interested logic underneath any vote from the 
logic related to clientelism, is not the fact that people vote one way or the other 
because of their interests. Individuals who have the freedom to vote for the 
government and the same freedom to vote against the government, according to 
their interests, exercise their political autonomy as they see fit. What happens in 
clientelistic relationships is that the individual has a significant restriction on their 
freedom to vote against the authority providing him or her with personal 
advantages. The harm to individual political autonomy can be identified in this 
moment: it is difficult for him or her to oppose the authority by voting or to 
exercise some unencumbered control of the state action in times of election.  
 
If, as stated above, people would not have the freedom to vote against the 
Government, is seems correct to say that clientelism limits the political autonomy 
of the individual in a significant way. Depending on the nature of the benefit 
provided by the authority, on how the benefit is provided and on the need of the 
people who receive it, this relationship of dependence, simultaneously existential 
and political, can be more or less intense. If the benefit is connected to the very 
survival of the individual and if it is continuous, individuals may be induced to 
support, continuously, the political group that provides it – regardless of other 
considerations – because the benefit is, after all, essential or extremely relevant to 
their own subsistence25.  
 
																																																								
25  This does not mean that only poor people are extremely vulnerable to this kind of 
dependency. A similar phenomenon is observed in relation to public officials who occupy, for 





It is not hard to notice that conditional cash transfer programs, such as  
Bolsa Família, have most of the characteristics listed above, providing a favorable 
environment for the development of clientelistic relations between the program 
beneficiaries and the authority that manages the program. Besides the theoretical 
perception of this risk, the studies already conducted in Brazil, and mentioned 
above, show that, in fact, the results of recent elections, particularly for positions 
in the Executive branch, have been strongly influenced by the bond of loyalty 
from the beneficiaries of the BFP – more than 25% of the population –, induced to 
vote for the groups supported by the authorities that manage the program. 
 
Hunger was, and to some extent remains to be, a serious problem within 
Brazil, and one cannot minimize the importance of the BFP in promoting the 
fundamental right to access to food, to food security and, indirectly, to health. The 
BFP intends to prevent situations of misery and ensure minimum living conditions 
for the poorest population and has been successful in this goal. The problem is that 
the temporary nature of the program – at least within one generation – is not real: 
the program, as structured, does not help people overcome the poverty cycle so as 
to be able to fulfill, by themselves, their and their families’ basic needs. It has been 
seen above that although this is one of the stated objectives of the BFP, there is no 
evidence of progress towards this end. A bit on the contrary: after about 10 years 
of BFP, the amount of people benefited from the program only grows, reaching 
today more than 25% of the population. On the other hand, the negative impact of 
the program on the political autonomy of this group of people seems undeniable. 
In this context, it seems important to discuss how these collateral effects could be, 





The problem described above is not a simple one. The pure theoretical 





participation and fighting starvation in a fancy way. Nonetheless, in the more 
concrete level of the public policy discussion, when real people are involved and 
results are not perceived immediately, this dispute cannot be solved so easily. The 
mere awareness of the problem is already something important in the discussion.  
 
Furthering the discussion, it is time to try to examine the questions 
proposed in the beginning of this paper. Are clientelism, and the consequent 
restriction on poor people political autonomy, the inevitable price to be paid to 
solve the problem of hunger? But for how long, if the conditional cash transfer 
programs are not able to induce autonomy in generating income? Is the present 
generation of adults really lost, and the only possible thing to do is to invest in 
their children? Is political autonomy actually less important and should be 
sacrificed for the achievement of a greater good? But sacrificed for how long and 
to what extent? After all, how can any discussion about the BFP be framed 
considering not only the food security issue but also the political autonomy of the 
program beneficiaries? It is possible to imagine two completely different 
approaches to the problem.   
 
One possibility would involve an attempt to politically disconnect the BFP 
of any political group in particular, turning it into a permanent policy of the 
Brazilian State. The purpose here would be to try to blur the link people identify 
between the program and some authority or political party in particular, so that its 
beneficiaries would not fear to lose the benefit if not voting for the incumbents.  
But how this result could be produced? If it can, ever, be produced. One could 
consider changing the Brazilian Constitution in order to incorporate the BFP on a 
permanent basis. In any case, however, running the program demands several 
decisions that will always be in the President’s sphere of action – he or she will 
inevitably be connected to the program. One could consider, also, another 
possibility, involving the opposing party behavior in the political campaign. 
Indeed, the clientelistic impact of the BFP would be lessened when the opposing 





are already behaving this way so, at least over time, there is a possibility that this 
negative impact of the BFP could be minimized.  
 
Another approach for the problem – and, of course, the most desirable one 
– would be to try to speed up the sustained emancipation of families, so that 
participation in the BFP would become, in fact, temporary. The general idea 
would be that, after some time in the program, the families would actually be able 
to leave it because they would have overcome poverty and could generate, by their 
own means, enough income to meet their needs. The dependence cycle would then 
end and also the clientelistic impact on political autonomy. But, again, how this 
result could be produced and when? It is important to notice that the BFP, as other 
conditional cash transfer programs, focus on (at least) two different generations: 
the adults and the children/teenagers. Let’s start with the adults. 
 
The adults are the ones that earn so little from their labor that they cannot 
support their family. The BFP provides them with food, basically, and demands 
attention to health care routines. They will not starve. But how could these adults 
overcome poverty and generate, by their own means, enough income to meet their 
family needs? Some programs, in other countries, work with a maximum period of 
permanence. This rule assigns the burden of trying to overcome the cycle of 
poverty to the individual himself (or, most frequently, herself). Setting a time limit 
may create some stimulus, in terms of personal responsibility, to those who can do 
something about their situation but don’t do what they can. However, often 
individuals simply will not have the means to do anything more to leave poverty 
behind. Picture a couple with several children, which do not have any professional 
qualification: a very common situation in Brazil. Both work all day long but earn 
so little from their labor that their income is not enough to meet the needs of their 
family, so they receive the BFP benefits. They live far away from the places they 
work and spend a considerable amount of time on public transport, which makes 
impossible, for instance, to take any kind of training course at night. In addition, 





can offer grows continuously over time, making it more difficult for them to find 
any well paid job.   
 
The amount paid by the BFP in the current model is not sufficient to fulfill 
the family’s basic needs and allow one of the adults to stop working for some 
years and invest in his or her professional qualification. That is not the purpose of 
the program anyway. So, which kind of personal effort would be reasonable to 
expect from these adults to overcome the poverty cycle of their family while 
receiving the benefits of the BFP? Giving these people the opportunity to study 
and enhance their chances of qualifying for better paid jobs – so they are able to 
generate enough income for their families – seems important, but the mere 
existence of training programs with this purpose, even the ones free-of-charge, 
will not be enough if people do not have real conditions to attend them. Let’s turn 
our attention, now, to the future generation: children and teenagers. 
 
 The BFP has three basic purposes when dealing with children and 
teenagers: prevent hunger, avoid certain diseases and keep them at school. In this 
context, the idea, referred to above, of setting a maximum time limit for 
participation in the BFP can damage not only the adults with the threat of 
starvation, but also the children and teenagers in the family. Considering children 
and teenagers, the logic underneath the public policy seems to be the following: 
the next generation will receive an educational background that will make possible 
to these children and teenagers, when adults, to generate enough income to fulfill 
their needs and their future families’. At this moment in the future, the cycle of 
existential and political dependency will end. If breaking the cycle of poverty 
within a generation, as seen above, presents a number of difficulties, the 
intergenerational breaking, even with mid-term results, should not be ignored as 
the focus of public policy.  
 
The problem is that overcoming the intergenerational poverty cycle 





now by the State to children and teenagers will not allow them, in the future, to 
have jobs that pay enough to fulfill their families’ needs, the poverty cycle will be 
reproduced in the next generation. The children of the present beneficiaries of the 
BFP will continue to be, as adults, beneficiaries of the program too, and the cycle 
of existential and political dependence will continue for, at least, the next 
generation. The BFP does not intend to deal with the quality of the public 
education in Brazil and it is probably not reasonable to expect this kind of 





Brazil is not willing to let their citizens starve and the BFP has had 
considerable success in minimizing hunger, secure minimum standards of food 
safety and remove a major portion of the Brazilian population from levels of 
extreme poverty. At the same time, evidence suggests that the BFP impairs the 
political autonomy of the program beneficiaries (over 25% of the Brazilian 
population now), who are induced not to vote against the authority that manages 
the program and his/her political group.  
 
Attempts to turn the BFP into a permanent policy, not perceived by the 
population as politically connected to any political group, can help to lessen the 
clientelistic impact the program has. The ideal outcome, however, would be to 
help families to overcome situations of poverty and severe poverty within the 
present generation, ending, then, the cycle of dependence. It does not seem 
feasible, though, to produce this kind of result within a generation. In this context, 
the discussion about political autonomy of the BFP beneficiaries will have to go 
beyond the program and focus on the next generation and on the conditions 
children and teenagers will have, in the future, to break the dependence cycle their 





certain, the quality of public education provided now to children and adolescents 
in Brazil. 
 
  
